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a b s t r a c t
Even when presented with the same choices multiple times, humans often make different decisions.
We re-analyze data from five experiments using repeated choices in the domain of risky and inter-
temporal choices and show that choice consistency is directly linked to cardinal differences in
independently-estimated utilities. Strength of preference is monotonically related to choice consis-
tency, with choices being more inconsistent when the alternatives are more similar in preference
terms.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
‘‘Common experience suggests, and experiment confirms, that
a person does not always make the same choice when faced
with the same options, even when the circumstances of choice
seem in all relevant aspects to be the same’’.
[Davidson and Marschak (1959)]
1. Introduction
Research in stochastic choice has shown that human beings
often make different choices even when repeatedly confronted
with the same set of options (e.g., Tversky, 1969; Hey and Orme,
1994; Ballinger and Wilcox, 1997; Conte et al., 2011). There
is, however, no universally-accepted view on the determinants
of choice inconsistency. Hey (2001) found that consistency im-
proves with repetition for some subjects, but remains low for
others. Andersson et al. (2016) suggest that higher inconsistency
might be associated with lower cognitive ability and, as a re-
sult, bias estimates of the relation between the latter and risk
aversion. Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) argue that one factor
behind choice inconsistency might be idiosyncratic preferences
for randomization.
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Choice inconsistencies are in agreement with discrete choice
and random utility models as pioneered by Marschak (1960)
and McFadden (1974, 2001). In those models, underlying utility
differences for a pair (x, y) are perturbed by a noise term ε
and actual choice follows the realization u(x) − u(y) + ε. As a
consequence, the probability of a choice which goes against the
underlying utility difference is larger if u(x) − u(y) is closer to
zero. It follows immediately that consistency in repeated choices
should be higher in the latter case. This is also an implication of
the choice model of Luce (1959), because it can be recast as a
random utility model (Anderson et al., 1992, Chapter 1).
Inconsistent choice is also in agreement with evidence dating
back to Fechner (1860). A robust finding from psychophysics
is that, in discrimination tasks, errors are more frequent when
stimuli are more similar, a fact usually referred to as a ‘‘psycho-
metric relation’’ (e.g., Dashiell, 1937; Laming, 1985; Wichmann
and Hill, 2001). This is often taken as evidence that decisions
might derive from noisy processes of internal evidence accumula-
tion in the human brain Shadlen and Kiani (2013) and Fudenberg
et al. (2018). Thus, choices involving more similar alternatives
(hence harder) should lead to higher inconsistency if repeated.
However, in this literature, the similarity across stimuli is either
objective (length, weight, brightness) or based on self-reported
ratings (liking). In contrast, a given, objective scale is rarely given
in economics, as underlying preferences need to be revealed or
estimated. The difference has been discussed in Alós-Ferrer and
Garagnani (2018).
In this work, we directly test the hypothesis that economic
decisions where expected utility differences are closer to zero
result in a higher degree of inconsistency. We re-analyze five
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109672
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different datasets (four with choices under risk and one with in-
tertemporal choices) where subjects were repeatedly confronted
with the same binary choices and provide robust evidence of a
‘‘strength of preference’’ result in choice consistency: (repeated)
choices are more inconsistent when alternatives are ‘‘closer to in-
difference’’. Hence, our approach relates individual-level utilities
and observed choice consistency.
We employ an out-of-sample estimation procedure, where
the utility difference for a given choice pair is estimated from
decisions which do not include that choice pair. This is impor-
tant, because standard utility estimation through random utility
models (McFadden, 2001) assumes a psychometric relation, and
hence a within-sample fitting approach might produce spurious
results.
2. The datasets
Hey (2001), whose dataset was also used by Moffatt (2005)
and Conte et al. (2011), investigated whether deviations from
Expected Utility theory decay with repetition (N = 53, 100
lottery choices, 5 repetitions on different days). Davis-Stober et al.
(2015) studied whether lottery choices (N = 60 subjects, 20
lottery choices, 24 repetitions) could be represented by utility
functions or not. For comparability, we exclude a within-subject
treatment which used time pressure (results are qualitatively
unchanged if we include it). Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) investi-
gated whether decision makers display a preference for deliberate
randomization (N = 80, 10 lottery choices, 4 repetitions). We
exclude a second treatment where subjects were made aware of
the repetition. McCausland et al. (2020) evaluated random utility
models and found that a large majority of the subjects behaved in
alignment with those (N = 141, 10 lottery choices, 6 repetitions
intermixed with other choices). Last, He et al. (2019) test the
predictive power of exponential and hyperbolic discounting (we
rely on their Experiments 1–2: N = 89, 60 binary choices, 4
repetitions).
The datasets were collected to answer different questions
and represent a variety of decision environments with different
implementations and characteristics. In isolation, each dataset
might require a discussion of their design and implementation
particularities. Taken together, they deliver robust evidence of the
effect we discuss.
3. Utility estimation
To implement an out-of-sample analysis, we split each dataset
in two sets of decisions, each one containing all the repetitions
of half of the choice pairs. We then estimate utility parameters
for each subject and use the ones derived from odd-numbered
choice pairs to evaluate the utility differences of even-numbered
ones, and vice versa. This avoids using the same decisions for
estimation and for testing. Our results do not change with dif-
ferent out-of-sample approaches, as e.g. using an initial block of
observations for the estimation, or a leave-one-out procedure.
For the first four datasets, we estimate individual-level risk
attitudes with a standard additive random utility model (e.g., Mc-
Fadden, 2001), following well-established procedures (e.g. Mof-
fatt, 2015). We consider normally-distributed errors and assume
a normalized constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function as





, if r ̸= 0
x
xmax
, if r = 0,
where xmax is the upper bound of the outcome variable x. All
results remain qualitatively unchanged assuming a constant rel-
ative risk aversion utility function instead, or implementing a
random parameter model (Loomes and Sugden, 1998), which
postulates a different noise specification.
For the dataset of He et al. (2019), we use the same procedure
but, following those authors, assume a two-parameter hyperbolic
discounting model (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). Assuming
quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997) instead does not
qualitatively change the results.
4. Results
Consistency is defined as choosing the same option across
all repetitions. To make the results comparable, in each dataset
utility distances were normalized to have a maximum value of
one. Fig. 1 depicts the proportion of inconsistent choices as a
function of estimated utility differences for all five datasets. For
ease of presentation, the figure uses a binning procedure over the
x-axis, with bins of width 0.01. That is, the y-value of each point
represents an average for all observations with utility differences
in the same bin.1
Table 1 displays panel Probit regressions on the likelihood of
a consistent choice for the same datasets. That is, the dependent
variable is a dummy taking the value one if the subject chose
the same option for all instances of the corresponding choice
pair. All datasets display the expected pattern, with smaller utility
differences resulting in more inconsistencies, as reflected by an
inverted U-shaped relation between choice inconsistency and ex-
pected utility differences. Inconsistencies are maximized around
zero, and become gradually smaller in magnitude as those dif-
ferences increase. All regressions indicate higher consistency for
easier choices, as measured by utility differences. The effect is ob-
served at the 1% significance level in all five datasets.2 The mag-
nitudes of the coefficients are also comparable, except for Davis-
Stober et al. (2015), which involves a much larger number of
repetitions than the other datasets.
For Davis-Stober et al. (2015), the plot shows a larger number
of inconsistencies than in other cases (Fig. 1, top-right). This is
because the consistency requirement is very stringent, due to the
large number of repetitions (24). As an illustration, the middle-
left panel of Fig. 1 plots the same data defining choices for a pair
to be consistent if strictly more than 75% of the choices (19 or
more) were identical.
Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) and McCausland et al. (2020)
included choices with a (transparently) stochastically dominated
lottery, depicted as red diamonds in Fig. 1. The dummy Domi-
nated in Table 1 shows that choices involving dominance present
very high consistency, independently of utility differences, but,
remarkably, the latter remains a significant predictor of choice
consistency even when controlling for dominance.
5. Discussion
We have shown that decisions become more consistent as
the difference in estimated utilities between the alternatives be-
comes larger. Of course, parametric utility estimation requires the
choice of a possibly-arbitrary functional family of utilities, but our
analysis remains unchanged for alternative specifications.
We conclude that strength of preference is one of the di-
mensions underlying choice consistency. Obviously, we do not
claim it to be the only dimension. For example, transparent
1 Whether a utility difference is positive or negative in Fig. 1 is based on the
first presentation of the stimuli (left minus right). This is because in Agranov
and Ortoleva (2017) repetitions were identical. However, in the remaining works,
presentations were randomized.
2 Unsurprisingly, the relation is weaker or absent if one uses expected values
instead. See also Alós-Ferrer and Garagnani (2018).
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Fig. 1. Proportion of inconsistent choices as a function of utility differences across different datasets. Top-left: Hey (2001). Top-right: Davis-Stober et al. (2015),
with the extreme definition of consistency (all choices equal). Center-left: Davis-Stober et al. (2015), with consistency defined as more than 75% identical choices.
Center-right: Agranov and Ortoleva (2017). Bottom-left: McCausland et al. (2020). Bottom-right: He et al. (2019). Red diamonds (center-right and bottom-left)
represent pairs involving stochastic dominance.
Table 1
Random effects probit regressions, probability of a consistent choice.
Consistent Hey01 DSBC15 AO17 McCetal20 HGB19
Utility distance 4.924*** 0.727*** 4.157*** 6.431*** 5.950***
(0.377) (0.087) (0.474) (0.614) (0.518)
Dominated 1.032*** 1.292***
(0.219) (0.080)
Constant −0.034 −5.609*** −0.894*** 0.567*** 0.457***
(0.066) (0.506) (0.042) (0.070) (0.122)
N 5300 1200 800 1410 5340
Log Likelihood −2163.021 −283.269 −1758.842 −5167.300 −1427.746
Wald test 170.85*** 69.63*** 90.81*** 321.13*** 131.70***
Notes: Hey01: Hey (2001). DSBC15: Davis-Stober et al. (2015). AO17: Agranov and Ortoleva (2017). McCetal20: McCausland et al.
(2020). HGB19: He et al. (2019). Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
dominance clearly reduces inconsistency independently of utility
differences. However, the evidence shows that utility differences
play an important role for choice consistency in economic deci-
sions, as predicted by discrete choice models McFadden (1974,
2001). These results also support stochastic choice models link-
ing utilities and choice probabilities (e.g., Debreu, 1958; Luce,
1959), which is in contrast with the neoclassical view of ordinal
preferences and deterministic choices (Hicks and Allen, 1934).
The implications of this research are twofold. First, data taking
into account the relation between inconsistency and strength of
preference could potentially be used to complement the literature
that aims to distinguish between alternative models of stochastic
choice (e.g., Buschena and Zilberman, 2000; Rieskamp, 2008), but
which generally does not rely on repeated choices. Second, the
results suggest that high levels of noise in decisions under risk
might sometimes be due to the use of similarly-valued options.
For instance, this observation might be of relevance for the lit-
erature on the elicitation and stability of risk preferences (Frey
et al., 2017; Schildberg-Hörisch, 2018; Garagnani, 2020), as the
amount of noise elicited by a method will be a function of the set
of choices it relies on.
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